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Abstract 
 
This master essay examines whether regional political institutions affect the imperative of 
firms to invest in innovation. It uses multilevel modelling techniques to explicitly test the 
spatial dimension of regional institutional embeddedness of the innovation process using 
micro-data on manufacturing firms in Sweden. The main argument of this essay is that firms 
are embedded in a region and that the quality of the political environment of that region 
matters to the innovation investment imperative. Political institutions, as measured by voting 
shares, are argued to be signaling mechanisms to firms on the durability and stability of 
committing investment in innovation as well as a proxy variable for civic engagement in the 
region that would allow communities to overcome collective action problems which can be 
important to the innovation process particularly when this process relies on tacit information 
that are spatially sticky. The thesis found positive albeit statistically insignificant results of the 
hypotheses apart from size of the firm mattering to the innovation investment schedule of the 
firm. 
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1. Introduction 
 
At the nexus of economic geography and innovation studies is a fundamental claim that 
institutions matter to the innovation processes of firms.  Institutions are said to be spatially 
sticky to certain localities and constitute the framework conditions in which firms are 
embedded when they make their location and conduct their activities. One such spatial 
configuration is the region and one such firm activity is the development of innovation with 
which firms undertake. Underpinning these processes, shaping and conditioning their 
outcomes, are the incentives, constraints and mechanisms, generated by these spatially 
configured institutions. Of the myriad of institutions that seem to matter, political institutions 
and the quality of which, are believed to be integral to industrial dynamics and firm activities 
because ‘markets are, themselves, a political construction’  (Nelson 1994, Gertler 2010). It 
situates the boundaries of transactions that can be carried out with the use of formal 
institutions such as laws and policies, as well as signals the prospects of firms in the long-term. 
Furthermore, signals from the political environment can be instrumental in engendering 
investments in research and development (R&D) for innovation, for example, which are 
needed towards achieving firm goals such as the creation of new products or more efficient 
processes. These signals can stem from such things like the creation of new product standards 
or the state participating in new international environmental protocols or even active 
interventionist policies in the market for innovation such as government procurement 
programs (Edquist and Hommen 1999, Mazzucato 2011). Conversely, transaction costs 
associated with applying for permits, getting products certified, and compliance with new 
regulatory standards may inhibit the ability or willingness of firms to invest in research and 
development. These are just a few examples of the ways in which specific types of institutions 
affect firm activities. The point is that there are potentially short and long-run consequences 
of political institutions on the ability of firms to innovate and the activities associated towards 
this end.  
 
And yet, despite this widely acknowledge interdependence with the political arena and the 
potential impact of these institutions on the distribution of economic activities across time 
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and space, these political institutions are treated like black boxes in the economic geography 
literature or worse, completely relegated to the sidelines. Existing studies in economic 
geography, which to some extent, do examine political institutions tend to typify political 
institutions to tendencies of types of innovation to matching firm output (Hall and Soskice 
2001). Whist this typology can be useful but it is problematic because  aggregating institutions 
to this extent can obscure the fact that political institutions are complex and multifarious 
(Boschma and Capone 2014). Unpacking these political processes and examining more closely 
to what extent these particular types of institutions affect firm performance in terms of 
research and development output, is needed.  
 
Furthermore, whilst significant empirical evidence demonstrates theoretically established 
links between institutions and the innovation processes through various case studies (Edquist 
2005), there seems to be a dearth of quantitative approaches dealing in institutions in the 
economic geography literature with some exceptions (Neffke, Henning et al. 2011). Part of the 
difficulties in finding an appropriate quantitative approach is that the complexity of the 
innovation process is not easy to model and measures of abstract things like the quality of 
political institutions are difficult to construct. Another reason is that institutionalists within 
the economic geography discipline have tended to prefer qualitative studies to quantitative 
approaches (Amin 1999). This has made it difficult to generalize these findings and establish 
the empirical dimension of this theory and the extent of the validity of these approaches in 
economic geography. 
 
This Master thesis then, aims to fill this research gap by exploring the interactions between 
firms in their pursuit of innovation and the role of regional political institutions in this process. 
Specifically, this thesis will interrogate the research question “To what extent do regional 
political institutions influence firm investment in innovation?”  The main aim of this thesis is 
to quantitatively test the interdependence between regional political institutions and firm 
investment in innovation. This thesis will take the specific country case of Sweden. Even if 
nationally configured political institutions do not have much variation across regions in 
Sweden due to a relatively homogenous and political landscape, there has been an increasing 
trend of devolution of power to regional governance bodies that give them scope for 
independence which, in turn, may influence the rates of participation in regional elections. 
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Additionally, the heterogeneity of firm responses to these political conditions may explain the 
uneven landscape in the distribution of economic development across space and time. These 
two things suggest that it is relevant to take Sweden as a country case. The other reason for 
choosing Sweden is an empirical one. It has some of the highest quality data available. Testing 
will be done using a multilevel analysis, a very demanding method in terms of data quality, 
with evidence drawing from firm data from 2008 and 2009 as well as the ULF register data 
from SCB 2008. A specific regional condition will be focused on which will be the quality of 
political institutions as measured by shares of voting per region. This thesis argues that the 
strength of the political institution of elections are captured in voting share because it directly 
measures the democratic participation in the region which can be reasonably interpreted as 
a proxy for civic engagement in the region.  
 
In a broader sense, elections can be a signaling mechanism to firms that the political 
environment is facilitated by a peaceful transition of power which in turn, gives regional 
governance structures continuity and durability to the extent that firms can invest in 
something as inherently risky as innovation in the form of research and development 
investments as measured in this thesis using R&D expenditures. Payoffs from investments in 
innovation tend to be uncertain and may take time before costs are recouped so a stable 
political environment signaled by peaceful and democratic transitions of power supported by 
the electorate, enables this investment in innovation since firms can recoup their costs from 
these investments in the long run without fear of expropriation or reneging from contracts by 
the state. One could argue that firms in Sweden do not really need this signaling mechanism 
because the country is evidently politically and economically stable and have been for 
decades. This suggest that firms will behave and expect ‘business as usual’ in spite of voting 
shares not because of it. This can be because firms in Sweden have internalized the 
expectation for stability in their output schedule. Put in another way, signaling of the stability 
of the political environment would, on the face of it, be more applicable in a cross-country 
analysis case where differences in institutional quality can better demonstrate why an 
investment in a stable country, as opposed to a war-torn one, would play a greater part in the 
decision calculus towards investments in firm innovation (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 
1999). However, as stable as Sweden is, regions across the country have undergone 
tremendous changes with respect to its industries which defined the economic and social 
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structures and character of Swedish regions. Industries such as the paper and textile industries 
have all but died out in many parts of the Scanian region in the south, for example. These 
economic upheavals could potentially have consequences for the quality of the political 
environment and civic attitudes within these regions especially since these communities were 
tied to these industries for their livelihood. A substantial loss of livelihood could potentially 
tear communities apart or at the very least reduce the social capital of a community. Even 
with a functional social safety net from the state through unemployment benefits, a general 
decline in the labour market opportunities in regions can lead to fragmented communities 
experiencing hardship.    It is worth peering closer into a country that is generally taken for 
granted as stable because whilst this may be true aggregately and relatively, there may be key 
differences across its regions due to the uneven pace of economic development landscape. 
Investigating the signaling mechanism to firms within a stable country like Sweden on cross-
regional basis is relevant, if only to confirm that stability holds despite large economic changes 
across regions. Furthermore, voting participation can be a proxy measure of the general 
environment for firm activities including investments in innovation. High rates of political 
participation suggests high levels of civic engagement from society (Putnam 1995). Civic 
engagement tends to stimulate cooperation, collaboration, and thus, the potential ability to 
overcome collective action problems. This can be potentially important to the process of 
innovation for firms. Innovation is enabled when different stakeholders collaborate in society 
and when tacit information is shared. This behavioral outcome in society is more likely when 
civic engagement is strong and voting share is one way of measuring this of non-market quality 
of a region that firms need to take into consideration when investing in R&D. Voting shares at 
the regional level are taken from the ULF register data collected by the Statistical Bureau of 
Sweden (SCB).  
 
By using the multilevel approach, elements of the methodology circumvent the limitations of 
traditional methods in use such as case studies which are not generalizable or ordinary least 
square regression methods which assume away the spatial qualities of the region. Regions 
constitute the ‘institutional set-up’, which is why in this thesis, interaction terms are used in 
the empirical testing and specifically tests the interdependence of the regional conditions with 
certain firm attributes. This is done because it is recognized that ‘regions’ are not merely 
factors of determination but rather regions provide conditional factors eliciting varying 
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responses from heterogeneous firms made distinct by differences in absorptive capacity, 
resources and abilities to appropriate knowledge to generate returns on the innovation 
process such as research and development investments. 
 
This essay attempts to argue that the regional political environment and the democratic 
participation of citizens matter to this part of the investment behavior of firms. Multilevel 
modelling techniques are employed to be able to demonstrate variance in the firm response 
to regional institutional conditions; moreover, that the characteristics of the firm, particularly 
size, impact the response of the firm to the regional conditions. Size is an important firm 
characteristic towards increasing firm investment towards research and development but no 
statistically significant estimates in the empirical work of this thesis were found when these 
same firm characteristics were interacted with institutional conditions. The reason for the 
positive effect of size on R&D firms may be that the more human capital a firm acquires, the 
more knowledge and capability it has to invest in R&D which confirms the expectation that 
bigger firms will tend to invest more in R&D. That this thesis did not find statistically significant 
evidence on the interaction between size and the regional institution of rates of political 
participation suggests that size is an independent factor for R&D expenditure and does not 
seem to be conditional on the political institution the firm is situated in, in Sweden. This thesis 
also found no statistically significant results from interacting the sectorial status of 
manufacturing firms that is supposed to have high rates of innovation and consequently, may 
be subject to specific regulatory frameworks, on firm output in R&D and neither in the 
interaction terms with voting share. This suggests that the manufacturing industry proclivity 
to innovate does not seem to be dependent on the political institution of voting behavior in 
Sweden although since sector and the interaction term are both statistically insignificant, this 
is mere supposition. 
 
Section 2 surveys the research themes and evidences regarding the intersectionality of 
political institutions and innovation, prevailing in the extant literature. Section 3 explores the 
relevant conceptual debates surrounding regions and the spatial dimension of institutions as 
well as the firms and sectors; Section 4 lays out the hypotheses. Section 5 surveys existing 
methodologies in the literature to demonstrate the point of departure of this essay’s empirical 
methodology. The interpretation of the results is included in this section. Section 6 states the 
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scope and limitations of the study; Section 7 explores the policy implications and Section 8 
finally, concludes the paper and makes recommendations regarding future research 
directions.  
 
2. Themes on Institutions and Innovation 
  
An emerging consensus in various academic disciplines is that institutions matter in explaining 
economic outcomes and trajectories. Central to this theoretical and empirical work is the 
notion that both formal and informal institutions constrain and enable outcomes of behavior 
of different economic agents. The right mix of institutions may engender a strong innovation 
milieu since it may provide the right incentives for firms, entrepreneurs, inventors, 
governmental agents and universities to invest in capacities that enable innovation. Empirical 
evidence from the institutional economics literature suggests that the society-wide formal 
institutions such as property rights and a strong legal system may help foster incentives to 
transact, more generally, and innovate, more specifically (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 
1999). Informal institutions  underpin the social interactions of people and inform decisions in 
economic life which may lead to community outcomes that enable innovation such as 
information sharing and coordination. The outcomes of the interaction of these institutions 
shape economic outcomes, firm decisions and consequently, innovation allocations. These 
interactions are then mediated, in varying degrees, by political channels (Farole, Rodríguez-
Pose et al. 2010). 
 
This consensus and interdisciplinary interest in institutions have engendered approaches to 
institutional analysis within economic geography that is wide-ranging and diverse which have 
included examining the impact of institutions on economic development (Rodríguez-Pose and 
Storper 2006), the nature and durability of institutions as manifested in path trajectories 
including dependence, renewal, creation, and plasticity (Martin 2000, Martin and Sunley 2006, 
Strambach 2010, Neffke, Henning et al. 2011) and in the analysis of regional economic 
development and innovation systems (Gertler 2010, Isaksen and Trippl 2014). In general, the 
study of institutions have been concerned with the structures that shape economic life as it is 
geographically, socially, politically and culturally situated and the processes that tend to 
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reproduce them over time, such as routines, conventions and networks. 
2.1. On Institutions in Economic Geography 
 
Institutions have become increasingly prominent in economic geography in particular, 
augmenting its theoretical foundations and empirical research agenda in understanding the 
economic landscape. Whereas previously, economic action was abstracted out from the social, 
cultural and political context it was situated in, an institutional framework allows the study of 
economic action as embedded in wider non-market structures (Martin 2000). Institutions are 
said to be the rules of the game, procedures meant to structure interactions in order to reduce 
uncertainty in everyday life; encompassing formal institutions such as laws and regulations 
and informal institutions such as norms, conventions, rituals and mores (North 1990). 
Institutions are sets of common habits, routines and established practices that regulate the 
relations between individuals, groups and organizations (Edquist 2005). Formal institutions 
tend to be codified and are subject to state jurisdiction and power whereas informal 
institutions are relatively more tacit and more culturally determined; they are more tenacious 
and durable (North 1990). Both types are believed to engender incentives and constraints that 
underpin economic action. Institutions help facilitate and shape coordination, cooperation and 
competition.  
2.1.1. A Note on Institutions and Rationality 
 
Since institutions exist to manage the uncertainties of interactions of individuals and 
organisations, the increasing complexity of situations such as economic development 
processes, move these actors to negotiate the institutional environment in a way which 
positively affects them and forwards their interests. These actors use features of the 
institutional environment such as laws, policies, regulations and constituency events such as 
elections as signals and interpret the significance of these events towards how it impacts their 
interests (Nee and Opper 2012). This is not to say that these actors are perfectly rational 
entities able to comprehensively process perfect information and are only self-interested as 
purported by neoclassical economics and New Economic Geography. They are subject to 
imperfect information with their rationality bounded by their abilities to comprehend 
complexity and is a function of their socio-political embeddedness with their interests wide-
ranging, from rent-seeking to altruism which is a view more in line with Evolutionary, 
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Institutional and Relational Economic Geography.  
2.1.2. On Pinning Down Institutions  
 
Employing the concept of institutions in economic geography is not without its issues which 
might partly explain why the institutional turn in the field has grown but have not been, for 
the most part, matched with quantitative empirical work. There is the view that there is little 
to gain from reducing institutional thought to a series of testable hypotheses or normative 
assumptions (Amin 2001). The decision on how to use the theory is dependent also on, 
amongst other things, what researchers regard as ‘institutions’, the varieties and levels of it. 
Dominant in economic geography are ‘soft institutionalism’ emphasizing habituated routines 
and conventions over policies and regulations, defining a useful distinction: institutions as 
containers of socio-economic organization or institutions as a process of institutionalization of 
socioeconomic practices (Amin 2001). By and large, institutions can sometimes be too open 
an idea that it tends to get over determined where everything can be argued as an institution. 
Therefore, there is value in clearly delimiting what constitutes an institution.  
 
Institutions are sometimes interspersed with organizations or communities and treated as the 
convergence of social expectations and the embodiment of norms and traditions, such as 
governmental bodies, agencies, firms or other groups to which membership is non-trivial 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Storper 2006). There is an undeniable link between institutions, 
organizations, social groups and communities but there is value in separating ‘the rules from 
the players’ in order to be more precise in the study of institutional dynamics so for the 
purposes of this thesis, institutions will thus be treated as rules (North 1990). Although there 
may be disagreement on the demarcation of how far you can take the institutional 
classification, these strands agree that wider structures beyond the atomistic individual 
influence economic action and development 
 
Another reason why numerous studies in economic geography have focused almost exclusively 
on case studies in order to investigate this relationship and whether the theory is right about 
the institutional framework conditions effect on innovation may be that institutions are 
notoriously difficult to measure, if data exists at all. But there is a growing amount of interest 
in the social sciences in constructing institutional indices and attempting to measure these 
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institutions (Beck, Clarke et al. 2001). It is often used to test their effects on economic 
development in various dimensions (Knack and Keefer 1995, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 
1999, Beck, Clarke et al. 2001, Acemoglu, Johnson et al. 2002). For the most part, the 
advancements in this field in measuring institutions have not spilled over to economic 
geography and innovation studies, with some exceptions (Rodríguez-Pose 2013). The 
important idea to highlight in this literature is the empirical evidence that measuring 
institutions is analytically robust and can be measured by way of proxy variables in a way that 
is both theoretically and empirically motivated.  
2.1.3. Critique of the Institutional Approach 
 
Critics of the institutional approach in economic geography claim that the use of institutional 
theory has not been fully articulated, lacks grounding in empirical material and tends to be 
over-determined because the definition and consequently, the usage is imprecise (Martin and 
Sunley 2006). Disparate uses of institutional concepts have become problematic (MacKinnon, 
Cumbers et al. 2002). Moreover, according to this stream, the use of the institutionalist 
approach in economic geography and in the discipline in general tends to be incomplete 
because it neglects the political dimension and assumes access to institutional endowments 
are even across time and space.  
This criticism is valid to some extent and it is addressed in this thesis in two main ways: firstly, 
precise definitions of institutions are adhered to in treating institutions only as rules rather 
than organizations as well and secondly, by acknowledging that formal institutions are the 
arena of the state and political institutions are the focus of this work. Political institutions are 
wide-ranging and diverse, from laws to policies to rules on how we conduct political life. One 
of the most established political rituals society subscribes to are elections which are guidelines 
for both political participation and how to transfer governance power within the state. Formal 
rules that govern political participation such as elections are rather unique relative to other 
formal institutions. When the democratic participation of individuals coalesce to an extent it 
satisfies an institutional threshold for political will and constituency, in a certain place and 
bound by specific geographical parameters, it results to a peaceful transition of power and 
control over governmental structures including over its coffers and the agenda setting powers 
of governance; and specific to that place and locality.   
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2.2. On How the Different ‘Turns’ Treat Institutions 
 
An institutional perspective contributes to the understanding of economic transformations 
and development or the lack thereof (Isaksen and Trippl 2014) and this has precipitated the 
study of institutions in economic geography to accompany various ‘turns’ in the discipline. The 
‘institutional/cultural turn’ has focused on the cultural construction of institutions and have 
produced concepts such as institutional thickness and thinness (Amin 1999, Amin and Thrift 
2000). These may be theoretically useful but it is difficult to conceptualise and measure 
‘institutional girth’ not to mention this author’s doubts on how well this metaphor actually fits 
the nature of institutions, seemingly conceiving of it as some monolithic object rather than 
unique combinations of disparate rules and conventions that it actually is. Some other 
attempts to incorporate institutions to the study of firm innovation output draw from the 
varieties of capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice 2001). This can be useful but the varieties of 
capitalism literature narrowly categorise economies according to simplistic typological 
designations which do not really capture the full breadth of the variations of institutions 
(Boschma and Capone 2014). Much like the institutional ‘thin/thick’ literature, these concepts 
are over stylized and artificially reduce the complexity of institutional analysis in the 
pedagogical pursuit to understand it.  
 
Political economic geography approaches also espouse the use of institutional analysis 
(MacKinnon, Cumbers et al. 2009). However, it seems that it privileges the state over other 
non-state and non-market actors in understanding institutional emergence which is not a self-
evident priority. Having said this, however, looking at political institutions is critical to 
understand the effect of situating firm activities within the political sphere to which this thesis 
attempts to contribute. Evolutionary economic geography has been criticized for relegating 
institutions but this has been increasingly inaccurate as the field progresses and with the 
emergence of research that incorporates institutions as it relates to firm heterogeneity 
(Boschma and Frenken 2009). The relational turn, on the other hand, purports the study of 
institutions as largely a product of social interactions (Bathelt and Glückler 2003, Bathelt and 
Glückler 2013) however social embeddedness tend to be over argued and accounts of 
individual action seem to be over-socialised. To claim that everything is socially determined is 
to adopt a definition of the ‘social’ in a very broad manner to the extent that it may lose its 
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meaning. Each turn has its strengths and weaknesses in its approach to institutional analysis. 
One way to reconcile these turns is to approach institutions in an engaged pluralist way which 
means that a dogmatic adherence to one ‘turn’ is not adopted but instead the strengths and 
weaknesses of each turn is considered and is integrated where they can be coherently done 
so (Hassink, Klaerding et al. 2014). This thesis takes this approach and treats institutions in a 
way that recognizes the multifarious role it plays the different dimensions of economic life 
while maintaining that an institution can be specific rules, in this case, a political institution 
that affect the economic imperative to innovate.  
2.3. On the Political Dimension of the Innovation Imperative 
 
This political dimension of the innovation imperative is not very well understood, partly 
because the notion of political control is treated as static in the innovation approach and 
endogenised within the institutional framework. One of the prevailing frameworks in studying 
innovation, the systems of innovation approach, does not account for transfers and transitions 
of power and control between competing political entities that might have differing agendas 
and priorities. Despite the fact that this can be important in explaining and understanding the 
incentives of firms to innovate because when society confers a mandate of governance to a 
certain group through elections, the agenda setting power of that group becomes an 
important determinant of the maintenance of certain institutions that influence the decision 
making capability of the firm towards their proclivity for R&D in innovation. With the 
previously discussed institutional turn in economic geography as well as calls for more political 
economy approaches in the field, emerging questions regarding the relationship between 
political institutions and innovation are justifiably appearing in the extant literature, at 
differing geographical scales (Hall and Soskice 2001, Tödtling and Trippl 2005, Gertler 2010, 
Mazzucato 2011, Isaksen and Trippl 2014). Noticeably, there seems to be a recent convergence 
in this research area between disciplines, economic geography, regional studies, institutional 
studies and innovation studies, sharing many of the foundations and theoretical concepts, 
rooted in the use of institutions to analyze the political dimension in the innovation process. 
The following subsections deconstructs this political dimension of institutions in so far as it 
relates to the innovation imperative. 
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2.3.1. On Electoral Participation 
 
The form of institution that will be examined in this thesis is political participation. This is not 
the only way that individuals connect with the political institutional environment but it is 
certainly the one that is the most ubiquitous. Under this form, there are multiple ways to 
participate politically in the public and private sphere: contacting local and national officials, 
working for political parties and other political organizations, discussing politics with neighbors, 
attending public meetings, joining election campaigns, signing petitions, speaking out in 
formal and informal debates and of course, voting which is the most common act of citizenship 
(Putnam 2001). Voting is, by a substantial margin, the most common form of formal political 
activity of citizens and it embodies the most fundamental democratic principle of equality. As 
an institution, it is formal law that mandates citizens to cast their vote which determines 
successions of power and control in governance. Voting demonstrates, to some extent, civic 
engagement in your wider community because it exhibits a sense of obligation to society and 
the belief that a single vote can contribute influence in the public sphere. In fact, voting is a 
good proxy measure of democratic participation. According to Putnam, people who actually 
vote are more likely to be interested in politics, to give to charity, to volunteer, to serve on 
juries (in the American context), to attend school board meetings, to participate in public 
demonstrations and to cooperate with their fellow citizens on community affairs. It follows 
then that a large voting turnout for an election can then signal a stable and durable political 
and social environment. One where its citizens are civically engaged and are interested in 
wider community issues beyond their personal interest. This institutional quality of the 
community can enable the overcoming of collection action problems such as the need to 
cooperate, share common resources and coordinate social concerns. It is sometimes hard to 
tell whether voting causes community engagement or vice versa, although evidence suggests 
that the act of voting itself encourages volunteering and other forms of citizenship. Political 
knowledge and interest in public affairs are critical preconditions for more active forms of 
involvement. ‘If you don’t know the rules of the game and the players and don’t care about 
the outcome, you’re unlikely to try to playing yourself’(Putnam 2001). 
 
Voting as a measure of political participation may also exhibit the voting patterns of the agenda 
of political parties such as the willingness to share resources across different cohorts 
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(increasing pensions, funding agricultural areas which entails a transfer of resources to other 
regions, reducing union power, etc.).  Often it is the lack of coordination in communities that 
is at the root of a lack of progress and they become subject to collective action problems. 
Hence, voting captures dimensions of inter and intra-cohort relationships and can measure 
the capability of communities to collectivise and cooperate. The theoretical underpinnings 
developed so far exhibit a clear multilevel structure to them, there is the firm as an entity 
embedded in a regional setting. If there are effects of the political context on the firms, these 
effects must be mediated by intervening processes that depend on characteristics of the 
regional context. The methodology in testing this relationship should then reflect this structure, 
instead of assuming it away.  
2.3.2. On How this Relates to Innovation 
 
Innovation approaches posit that firm participation in the innovation process do not exist in a 
vacuum but instead interact in an interdependent way with other organizations and 
institutions. These organizations may be other firms such as suppliers, customers, competitors 
or non-firm entities such as the state, universities, and government ministries. Institutions 
shape the behavior of organizations codified by shared laws, rules, norms and routines which 
collectively create an interplay of incentives and disincentives for innovation. These 
organizations participate in the research and development of new products and processes up 
to the commercialization of knowledge and transform them into useful products and processes 
so innovations can emerge. The innovation concept is wide and includes products as well as 
process innovation which are new ways of producing goods and services which may be 
technological or organizational (Edquist 2005). Innovation and the phases of it are an outcome 
of the interplay of institutions in both public and private sectors whose initiatives and 
interactions contribute to diffusing new technologies and in reproducing institutions. 
Economic as well as socio-political forces engender organizations and institutions and other 
factors in influencing the diffusion and emergence of innovations (Edquist, 1997).   
 
Political institutions such as electoral participation become an important factor to the 
innovation process in two main ways. Firstly, electoral participation serves as a signal 
mechanism to the firm that committing to investing in innovation will be situated in a stable 
political environment which should increase firm likelihood to invest. Product markets pose 
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uncertainty and a dilemma for firms in that economic actors must make investment and 
production decisions that necessarily shape long-term firm strategy and performance despite 
not being able to assess future actual risks. Despite all of these risks and uncertainty, producers 
must commit themselves and their employees and their resources to a certain level of output 
over a certain period. In order to overcome this commitment problem, firms rely on visible 
signals from the political environment that will make these decisions under conditions of 
uncertainty, viable. These signals affect the decision calculus of both suppliers and demanders 
as well as non-market actors competitors (Nee and Opper 2012).  There are many types of 
signals from the political environment but elections are particularly potent because the quality 
of it represents the extent to which there is a peaceful transition of power and in turn this 
signals how secure the market for transactions are in a country and this influences the decision 
of a firm to invest in innovation or not. Secondly, electoral participation is a proxy indicator for 
the firm in assessing the non-market environment for its investment such as whether the 
community is civically engaged to the extent that is able to overcome collective action 
problems that might be important for firm activities such as investing in innovation. It is often 
said that innovation requires coordination, working together and exchanging tacit information 
in order to discover processes and generate new ideas. Firms expending money to fund R&D 
might be more likely to do this if their activities are embedded in an environment where these 
coordination possibilities and civic engagement exists. Voting turnout is one indicator of this 
quality. 
2.3.3. ‘Strong’ Political Institutions 
 
Established evidence from literature shows that, in general, strong political institutions should, 
on the whole, help economies perform better. The definition of what constitutes ‘strong’ 
political institutions tend to be defined somewhat arbitrarily because there does not seem to 
be any real consensus as to what is the threshold. This becomes problematic at best and it 
might lead to a spurious result, at worst, particularly when strong political institutions may 
result in lock-in and a disadvantage in generating new input. This is illustrated in the case of 
state-owned enterprises in China, the performance in innovation have been outstripped by 
private or hybrid enterprises (Nee and Opper 2012) because of strong institutions that are able 
to intervene in the market. This is to say that defining the ‘right’ threshold of political 
institutions that is supposed to generate expected positive outcomes is very tricky.  
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2.3.4. Contingent vs. Deterministic 
 
Furthermore, treating political institutions as a determining factor misses the complexity and 
heterogeneity of the firm response to institutional conditions. Even if strong political 
institutions exist, some firms may not perform as well as expected based on its own inherent 
characteristics such as, for example, the size of the firm or its absorptive capacity (Giuliani 
2007). This suggests that the relationship between firm activities and innovation investment 
in particular is contingent on the characteristics of the firm as well as differing factors that may 
be unaccounted for such as the spatial qualities of where the firm is embedded in. A broader 
treatment of this research agenda on political institutions and innovation can be seen as 
indicative of larger systemic relationship and that this interaction is a general manifestation of 
the effects of institutions and framework conditions on economic performance and spatial 
capacity (Storper 1995, Saxenian 1996, MacKinnon, Cumbers et al. 2002, Srholec 2010). This 
leads to the discussion on the spatial site of this study which are regions.  
2.4. The Swedish Electoral System 
 
Elections in Sweden are held every 4 years which was introduced in 1994. It used to be held 
every three years. This paper samples the 2008 elections. The electoral votes both at the 
national and regional level. Elected municipal council make all pertinent decisions in their 
jurisdiction. The election system is party-based, the biggest of which are the Social Democrats, 
the Green Party, and the Left on the leftwing block and on the right-wing block are the 
Moderates, the Center Party, the Christian Democrats and the People’s Party. The block with 
the majority would be elected to govern at the national parliament or at the region or at the 
municipality level. The Swedish political landscape has had a 50 year old tradition of effectively, 
bipartisan politics (Pettersson-Lidbom 2008).  
 
In each region, there is a county administrative board. Regions are mainly responsible for 
particular social welfare issues, regional planning and works in conjunction with most public 
authorities at multiple levels. A bulk of the task of the regional council is devoted to health 
and medical services which constitute 80% of its expenditures (Nelson 1992). Other services 
include dental, education, theatres, museums and music and support for the local business 
sector. Public transport is also one of the regional council’s responsibilities, particularly those 
that connect the municipalities in that region. Finances for the regional council comes from 
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governmental grants and taxes. An elected assembly at the regional level takes all major 
political decisions and is accountable for them.  
3. The Spatial Dimension in Institutions 
 
Innovation processes are rooted in spatially configured institutions (Boschma and Martin 
2010).  These intangible assets become endowments to these localities which is why spaces 
such as regions are considered critical spaces for potential innovation (Belussi and Sammarra, 
2005; Boschma 2005).  Lundvall (1992) argues that production structures and the ‘institutional 
set-up’ are the two most important dimensions that jointly define a system of innovation. 
Taken more broadly, this approach suggests that innovating firms are embedded in a much 
wider socio-economic system in which political and cultural influences as well as economic 
policies help determine the scale, direction and relative success of all innovation activities. 
What seems to be a theoretical consensus is that the institutions within this framework affect 
the activities associated with the innovation process.  It is also said that the institutional set-
up converges in specific locations and are getting pinned down spatially.  
 
These spatial endowments include tacit knowledge and the ability to share and coordinate 
these inputs. Empirical findings show that in order for firms to compete, success depends 
increasingly upon the ability to produce new or improved products and process, and of which 
tacit knowledge constitutes the most important basis for innovation-based value creation 
(Pavitt, 2002). Using tacit knowledge is said to be a critical source of innovation or at the very 
least an important variable in the innovation process. Tacit knowledge is not easily ‘ubiquified’ 
and traded because it does not lend itself well to codification. Consequently, this type of 
knowledge is pinned down to specific locations such as regions. The difficulty is that tacit 
knowledge is ‘heavily imbued with meaning arising from the institutional context in which it is 
produced and this context-specific nature makes it spatially sticky’ (Gertler, 2003).  This puts 
regions as important sites for the innovation process as a whole. But it also highlights that 
these resources are not easily extracted without some level of cooperation and shared 
meaning. This is why civic engagement within a region can be an important conduit of tacit 
knowledge which could be invaluable to a firm’s decision to invest in innovation. 
 
However, probing the regional institutional landscape presents some difficulties because there 
  
20 
 
are numerous dimensions that constitute the ‘regional landscape’. This is also subject to the 
definition of ‘institutions’ that researchers subscribe to. There are empirical findings on the 
long-term evolution of the economic landscape of Swedish regions which have been tested on 
data from the technological relatedness of firms and industries, particularly revealing that 
there are strong tendencies towards path dependencies (Neffke, Henning et al. 2011). Findings 
show that technological relatedness seems to be a strong reason for firms to embed in regions 
and conversely, unrelatedness, a reason for exiting regions.  Empirical findings seem to indicate 
that there is technological cohesion in Swedish industries so much so that a technological 
classification can be premised to be a ‘path’ and a technological trajectory which, in turn, 
becomes the quality of the economic landscape of the region. These empirical findings 
represent an important contribution to how we understand the behavior of firms. The effects 
on the region from this process, is linked but might be, to some extent, exogenous and could 
potentially test for more direct measure of the regional condition.  
3.1. On Regions vs. Spatial Fetishism 
 
As discussed previously, regions have come into focus as a site for institutional endowments 
and economic activity not least of all because of the emergence of Emilia-Romagna, Baden 
Wurttemberg and Sillicon Valley as immensely successful hubs of innovation and economic 
development (Saxenian 1996, Amin 1999). The innovative trajectory of these regions have 
raised the question on whether their successes can be replicated elsewhere and whether 
regions can engender innovation in order to prosper. Some regions are said to have strong 
framework conditions and respond to new opportunities which enable the innovation 
processes to take place (Cooke, Gomez Uranga et al. 1997). This has led to concepts such as 
the ‘learning region’, ‘relational assets’, ‘institutional thickness’ which emphasize the 
importance of embeddedness in local conditions (Storper 1995, Asheim 1996, Saxenian 1996, 
Cooke, Gomez Uranga et al. 1997, Malmberg and Maskell 1997, Amin 1999, Lundvall, Johnson 
et al. 2002, MacKinnon, Cumbers et al. 2002, Asheim and Gertler 2005, Tödtling and Trippl 
2005, Morgan 2007). There can exist an ‘innovative milieu’ in the region which situate 
institutional endowments and ‘untraded interdependencies’ because they tend to be pinned 
to particular localities which potentially enable firms to capitalize on framework conditions 
such as a stable political environment with high rates of democratic participation.  
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Even if these stable framework conditions exist nationally across the board, some regions and 
some firms may be better suited in using their resources and their human capital in processing 
these conditions. Research into regions formerly focused on firm-centered and state-centered 
processes, keeping in line with the legacy of neoclassical economics with particular strategies 
in renewing lagging regions centered on redistribution and welfare policies but there is 
increasing empirical evidence to show that its source of local advantage is its institutional 
endowments (Amin 1999, Asheim and Gertler 2005). This suggests that economic activity 
should not be isolated from the spatial environment it is embedded in (Srholec 2010). The 
inherent problem with ignoring the structural conditions of a region is as much a theoretical 
problem in the literature as it is an empirical one. Ignoring the framework conditions ignores 
the site of the resources the firm uses which may be shaping its behavior and its incentives. 
The statistical problem with this is that it leads to underestimation of the standard errors and 
could result in unwitting invalid statistical tests, particularly in this instance where there is 
strong impetus from the theoretical implications in the literature to reflect this explicit 
multilevel structure of the phenomenon of innovation processes. 
 
This focus on regions, is not without criticism (MacLeod 1998, Lovering 1999, MacKinnon, 
Cumbers et al. 2002, Sunley 2008, Shearmur 2011). This side of the literature explains the focus 
on regions as one that is less motivated by theory but more as a byproduct of the ‘survival 
instincts of regional groups against being displaced by an increasingly globalizing world where 
the theory is led by policy rather than the other way around’. MacKinnon (2002) further 
explains that the implicit claim that ‘regions are entities with causal powers of their own are a 
form of ‘spatial fetishism’, privileging one geographical scale over another. The conceptual 
weaknesses of regions as entities is the supposed tension of regions having local endowments, 
the ‘ubiquification’ of which needs to be prevented by a group of people bound by shared 
norms, routines and conventions. And yet at the same time, these same community cannot 
depend on these internal endowments alone but instead must look for external inputs in order 
to be able to innovate and to avoid ‘lock-in’. This is said to be the conceptual weakness of 
regions as entities with the very essence of a region thinly developed as a theory (MacKinnon, 
Cumbers et al. 2002).  
 
One critique to MacKinnon is that his premise that learning regions and other similar concepts 
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‘share a concern for the creation of sustainable localized advantages in the face of globalisation’ 
seem to confuse theory for policy implications. If those governing regions were interested in 
constructing a comparative advantage, then this would imply that local advantages such as 
tacit knowledge need to be sustainable. Regional theories is not prescriptive in this way. Whilst 
it is true that regions are a political-economic organizations still need to be further developed, 
there have been progress, if not consensus, in developing regions as a theoretical entity such 
as for example looking at functional regions, spatial entities not constructed arbitrarily but as 
a site of economic activities and commuting. This thesis in particular uses functional regions 
in the empirical testing part to avoid spatial fetishism. 
 
The line of reasoning that regions form characteristics based on the institutional landscape 
they have is persuasive for two reasons. Firstly, governance determined at the regional level 
becomes an effective instituted process that is path dependent as shown by prominent studies 
in economics and economic geography which implies that economic policies and norms of 
governance will tend to persist creating a convergence of characteristics at the regional level 
(Knack and Keefer 1995, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 1999, Persson 2002, Persson and 
Tabellini 2006). Secondly, an interdisciplinary approach in terms of adopting empirical 
approaches that account for the political dimensions mentioned MacKinnon’s critique. Amin 
(2001) advocates a move towards a more open and plural conception of institutionalism in 
economic geography. This is why an attempt to use a political dimension in this research 
agenda to test the effect of the institutional endowment of political institutions. So the 
political dynamics that Mackinnon (2009) thinks should be part and parcel of the empirical 
exploration of institutions in a firm is compatible with theoretical foundations of economic 
geography. Furthermore, the missing elements in the theory that MacKinnon refers to is not a 
symptom of inherent theoretical problems but a reflection of the general trend in the empirical 
foci that researchers tend to choose. 
 
Even if these concepts of regions were rejected, accepting that regions are mere political-
economic organizations still makes it a unit of analysis fertile for testing. Political-economic 
organizations share interests and patterns of regulations and strategies and institutions that 
are not always but often delineated by jurisdiction in the decision-making process. This 
theoretical problem will be dealt with in this thesis in the following way: drawing from actual 
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regional infrastructure and testing their effects. Regional economies are developing and  
Storper argues that the region has acquired a central theoretical status because it has 
‘untradeable interdependencies’ (Storper 1995). 
3.2. On the Spatial Quality of Political Institutions 
 
Civic engagement with political institutions is place specific because voting, as part of political 
life, is spatially bounded (Putnam 2001). Voters tend to be registered according to 
neighborhoods, municipalities and regions. Civic engagement, as measured by voting, can 
reveal the capacity of communities to overcome problems that require collaboration and 
cooperation which firm activities like innovation tend to do. When information and knowledge 
is shared in a way that does not entail large transaction costs, this might confer efficiency gains 
on the firm.  There were very few studies that actually match levels of democratic participation 
to regions in order to see both within and between regional differences in democratic 
participation and instead would totalize these institutions and assume away variability, with 
some exceptions (Rutten and Boekema 2007, Srholec 2010). Many studies do however 
attempt to model a spatially-configured institutional landscape but do not quantitatively 
measure it.  
 
One of the most popular spatial sites for testing is the region, purported by some as the locus 
of economic activity. Charron et al (2014) uses political institutions data across Europe at the 
regional level with findings showing that there are large regional differences in some countries 
and that these differences correlate with levels of economic development. It represents a 
rather ambitious approach to gathering evidence on the effect of political institutions across 
different localities. Exploring the differences and similarities between the regionally 
constituted institutional landscapes would generate interesting observations. A natural control 
variable would be, though, is to model regions that have similar institutions but with 
heterogeneous firms so then it is possible to isolate the effects of regional institutions like 
‘democratic participation’ on different types of firms. This is one of the methodological 
decisions that will be pursued in this Master essay, using political institutions data from 
Swedish regions. Besides the fact that a multilevel model test of political institutions on 
Sweden does not seem to have been done yet, this country is quite well known having 
excellent data and a rather homogenous population with very little within country variation in 
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its political landscape across regions (Charron et al, 2014). This makes the Swedish case a good 
bet in testing the relationship between political institutions and research and development for 
innovation. Studies have conducted this test at different spatial scales, locations and quality – 
national frameworks, rural areas, developing regions, etc. (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 
1999, Rodriguez-Pose 1999, Hall and Soskice 2001). Other units of analysis include firms, R&D 
units, rural areas, regions, nations (Saxenian 1996, Tödtling and Trippl 2005, Rodríguez-Pose 
2013). Conventional macroeconomic approaches that use political institution indicators in 
growth models tend to miss the nuanced analysis engendered from evaluating measures at 
the regional level. Empirical evidence from this research is somewhat contentious. Some show 
that the strength of political institutions has a positive effect on product innovation and 
economic performance in general whilst others exhibit more caution. Even if there is 
confirmation that there is some complementarity between R&D and the political environment, 
some find that the political civic culture of certain industrial districts is an insufficient incentive 
for innovation because it is an activity which mainly relies on the economic profitability of the 
innovation. 
 
The changing nature of the innovation process itself, which is geared more towards learning, 
highlights the growing importance of political institutions that facilitate this process 
(Mazzucato 2011). The argument here is that innovation has come to be based increasingly on 
the interactions and knowledge flows between economic entities such as firms (customers, 
suppliers, competitors), research organizations (universities, other public and private research 
institutions) and public agencies (technology transfer centers, development agencies). The 
frequency and quality of these interactions can contribute to generating input for innovation 
but it is dependent on incentives and constraints which are engendered by the institutions 
which are spatially located. This affects how firms will plan and invest in research and 
developments towards this end.  
3.3. On Points of Departure 
 
The point of departure then, for this essay is to test the institutional framework conditions of 
regions on its effects on the innovation process; use research and development expenditures 
as the response variable; use multilevel modeling to extend traditional estimation techniques, 
use an uncommonly tested but theoretically relevant variable dimension of political 
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institutions which would be democratic participation as measured by the percentage of voters 
per region and finally, perform this test on data from Sweden because of the high quality in 
data and effective control mechanisms. This paper aims to make several contributions to the 
literature. Firstly, it aims to contribute empirical evidence on the effects of regionally 
configured political institutions on the firm, demonstrate a more robust and appropriate 
estimation method by using multilevel modeling. Secondly, it aims to incorporate more 
political dimensions in the study of innovation output in regions in order to capture the non-
market quality of the region as it impact firm activities. 
3.3.1. Previous Work Using the Multilevel Approach  
 
Srholec (2010) tests the effects of framework conditions on the innovation process using 
variables such as economic crimes, murders and unemployment (and other variables 
subjected to a factor analysis before being run in the models) attempting to capture the social 
dimensions of the region exogenous (to some extent, because path dependency studies have 
shown a feedback loop that generates correlation between interlinked factors) to the firm and 
focusing on the social dynamics of the region.  The econometric method seems robust in 
testing this relationship and can accommodate the internal logic of the economic geography 
approach. Using micro data from the Czech Republic, he finds that the quality of the regional 
innovation system directly influences the likelihood of a firm to innovate and that this effect 
decreases with the size of the firm as well as the social forces in the region were found to be 
relevant explanatory factors of innovation (Srholec 2010). The work is persuasive but is short 
on bridging the theory to the methodology. The factor analysis conducted in the article is a 
robust method but the data available on the regional conditions (crime, murders, 
unemployment) is not directly implicated in the theory of regions (Srholec 2010). At the very 
least, this study attempts to confirm the findings of the article that framework conditions in 
the region matter to the innovation output.  
 
This study aims to pursue a quantitative approach to measuring the regional condition and 
one that upholds the internal logic of the economic geography, assumptions like heterogeneity 
of the firm activities across regions and the institutional environment, differential effects; 
while addressing the claims that the political dimension have been sidelined by focusing on 
the institution of democratic participation in elections. There are some studies that test the 
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claim that innovation is shaped by institutions. But often the variables used as dependent 
variables are those like patents, instances of reported innovation in products and processes 
new to the firm and to the market as well as R&D expenditures much like it is used in this 
thesis. This approach is not without criticism, however. These measures do not capture actual 
innovation, innovation that which has been commercialized and allowed to interact in the 
market. It also does not measure the totality and the complexity of the innovation process as 
a whole. But still, using R&D expenditures has its own limitations and does capture some level 
of the investments of firms towards innovation and proxy the willingness of firms to engage in 
this process, albeit in a limited way.  
 
Recent work in the political economics literature, some using regression discontinuity designs, 
show that there is a causal link between politicians and fiscal spending in government at the 
national level (Persson and Tabellini 2004) and less in subnational governments (Ferreira and 
Gyourko 2009). However, to my knowledge, there are few studies in economic geography that 
specifically looks at the effect of these political dynamics on firm innovation imperative 
outcomes. Higher fiscal spending, in general, does not automatically imply higher spending 
and better outcomes from innovation within firms. There seems to be a lacuna of empirical 
evidence on the impact on innovation and if so, in what ways and to what extent. 
3.3.2. On Highlighting Heterogeneity of Firms  
 
Despite the recognition that traditional linear models on innovation and increasingly, the 
empirical work needed to substantiate the theories in economic geography, the quantitative 
methodology used to match these discussions have not seemed to have kept apace. Many 
studies continue to use traditional estimation techniques. This is problematic for several 
reasons. Firstly, firms are heterogeneous and their differences should not be assumed away in 
the model. Secondly, the relationship between political institutions and innovation is 
inherently hierarchical, one is the firm and the other is the region so it doesn’t make sense to 
not reflect in empirical models when testing this relationship. Out of possible models, this 
essay has chosen multilevel modeling because it is robust to handling these demands relative 
to more traditional estimation techniques (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008, Hox 2010, 
Srholec 2010). Here follows a detailed discussion of the particularities of this technique. 
 
  
27 
 
A crucial ingredient of economic geography is the heterogeneity of firms and current empirical 
methods at play in the literature seem to violate this key idea in the discipline and either 
assumes that all firms in one region behave in the same way or all firms are unique. The 
assumption that all agents act or perform in the same way when subjected to the same 
regional institutions contradict empirical findings that suggest the opposite. Giuliani (2007), 
among others, has demonstrated that agents in clusters differ widely in terms of economic 
power, absorptive capacity and network position, despite the fact that clusters are associated 
with a particular set of institutions. But this also contradicts the findings that all firms behave 
differently. ‘This variety can be understood from the fact that firms may develop routines in a 
path-dependent and idiosyncratic manner and territorial institutions are often so general such 
that specific effects at the firm level can still vary greatly’ (Boschma and Frenken 2009)). An 
appropriate empirical method needs to be made and relevant data need to be gathered.  The 
method chosen should allow these different levels to interact and allowing for heterogeneity 
amongst firms as they respond to the regional institutional conditions. 
 
 4. Hypotheses 
 
Despite a common region-specific institutional landscape, a fundamental premise of economic 
geography is the heterogeneity of firms. This implies that the response of firms to framework 
conditions must vary as well. The underlying reason for this variety is explained in Nelson and 
Winter’s (1982) seminal work which moved away from prevailing neoclassical assumptions at 
the time which postulates that firms are perfectly rational agents; instead this stream of the 
literature states that firms are instead bounded rational agents which intend to process 
information and make the best decisions possible but are hardly ever in possession of perfect 
information so they often make inefficient decisions that do not maximize their interest. 
Bounded rationality is the root of the heterogeneity of the firm (Essletzbichler 2009). 
Absorptive capacity is pointed to as one of the reasons for this variability (Giuliani 2007). Firms 
have different resources and capacities in processing information and signals and this 
processing power is subject to the complexity of the information. Even with extended 
networks, firms may not be able to appropriate resources for their own interests because of 
low absorptive capacity and inadequate technical human capital to transform this resources. 
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Depending on their characteristics, firms seem to adapt and change in different ways in 
response to the institutional environment. Given this, this thesis will test the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H1: The quality of the political institutional environment in the region as measured in voting 
share positively affects the R&D Expenditures. 
 
H2: The effect of regional political institutions on the firm is mediated by the size of the firm.  
 
H3: The effect of regional political institutions is mediated by the sector the firm belongs to. 
 
In addition to firm size as an important explanatory variable in the behavior of firms, the sector 
it belongs seems to be a critical component as well, according to prevailing theories because 
according to Boschma and Frenken (2009) institutions, particularly spatially-configured 
institutions which are considered territorial because they tend to retain durable structures of 
embeddedness within the locality, have a strong impact on the behavior of firms, industry and 
networking relations.  The reason for this is that patterns of institutions emerge for sectors as 
they are important in organizing and coordinating complex supply chains. Sector-specific 
institutions have developed over time in order to allow firms to routinize their activities across 
territorial boundaries and an intuitive way to organize this has been across sectors. Empirical 
evidence shows that much of the variance in innovative patterns can be explained by sectorial 
differences. Admittedly, this study captures this dimension in a very crude way by inserting a 
dummy variable for sector as an explanatory variable but it at least allows the interaction 
effects between the sector and the regional institution of voting for some results. These 
hypotheses will be directly taken to the dataset for quantitative testing.  
 
5. Empirical Methodology and Interpretation of Results 
 
Methods in economic geography in testing this institutional relationship with innovation have 
been largely dominated by case studies and other forms of qualitative studies. These methods 
are particularly useful when trying to capture the contextual, historical and complex process 
of innovation taking place in firm, sectors and regions. An excellent example of the 
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contribution of case studies is the in-depth work of Saxenian (1996) exploring both the success 
and failure, respectively, of innovation hubs Silicon Valley in California and Route 186 in 
Massachusetts.  
 
Whilst these findings constitute a significant contribution to the empirical evidence towards 
the impact of institutions on firm innovation and indispensable in guiding the development of 
a possible index of indicators, a quantitative approach is a necessary complement to this in 
order to make these findings robust and generalizable. It is rather difficult modeling the 
innovation process as it is not a discrete event but a complex and continuous one which 
includes unobserved and unexpected variability so testing a key component of this process 
might be useful. An additional difficulty is that any analysis situated within economic 
geography and innovation studies must conform to the ontological commitments of the 
discipline when implementing their empirical methodologies otherwise the empirical 
contribution to the field will be limited or inapplicable.  Some attempts to do this mostly come 
from the Science & Technology literature and they include using traditional estimation 
methods (Callois and Aubert 2007) using ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis, logit 
and probit models, structural equation models (Carmona-Lavado, Cuevas-Rodríguez et al. 
2010), two step models (Landry, Amara et al. 2002). These suffer from critical methodological 
and conceptual issues.  Firstly, the relationship between the firm and the region clearly has 
nesting qualities as implied by theory and is also hierarchical which implies that an appropriate 
model and data to be used should be hierarchical as well to accurately reflect this nature.   
There is relatively less within-country variation in Sweden across the political landscape in the 
region than other countries. What might differ is the economic and industrial landscape due 
to firm heterogeneity in terms of their strategies, resources and capabilities in their attempt 
to mediate the regional institutional environment they are situated in. If the political 
institutional environment is meant to constrain and enable firm behavior and output, then it 
is important to examine how the variety of firms across the regional landscape responds to 
the political environment and the institutions that constitute it.  
 
Generally, using proxy variables to capture political institutions is contentious. Political 
institutionalists tend to use corruption indices, amount of litigation cases for contract 
enforcement to measure the strength of the property rights system, presence of wars and 
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revolutions, change in constitutions, size of government and measure the effects of which on 
country performance (Knack and Keefer 1995, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 1999, Persson, 
Tabellini et al. 2003, Persson, Roland et al. 2007). Whilst these approaches represent a 
contribution to the field, it is limited by its reliance on perceptional data. Since this thesis seeks 
finer grained measure that can capture regional conditions, voting shares, as a direct measure 
of a political institution, per region as a measure of democratic participation in elections as a 
political institution will be utilized. Moreover, this regional condition of voting shares can 
illustrate the spatial configuration of the institutions environment in a certain locality which is 
why it is relevant to look at regions in such a stable country like Sweden. Voting shares can 
reveal the quality of civic engagement present in communities that reside in these regions 
which can impact firm activities, especially ones that require overcoming collective action 
problems such as non-cooperation and ‘free riding’.  
 
Also, manufacturing firms are typically sampled, possibly because it is a good control factor, as 
intuitively, the proclivity for innovation would be higher than other industries, controlling for 
the knowledge base. As for innovation, traditional explanatory variables rely on patents which 
are used to capture innovation but there are problems associated with such an approach 
because this does not really capture firm investment but only those that eventually lead to 
patenting (Landry, Amara et al. 2002). A more appropriate measure of it this is the research 
and development expenditures of firms because there the process of firm input is observed 
rather than just the outcomes. This might make more visible how firms respond to the 
institutional environment.  
5.1. On Alternative Data Sources  
 
Similar constructions prevail in different datasets used such as the Quality of Government 
database as maintained by the Quality of Government Institute at Gothenburg University in 
Sweden. These surveys, whilst excellent contributions to data sources on institutions, 
aggregate existing indices as well as adding on more data. It tends to rely on questions posed 
to people such as how trustworthy is your government, would your government respond to a 
complaint, do you think your government is corrupt, etc. Constructing proxy variables from 
answers from questions that may or may not be answered truthfully is problematic and may 
cast doubt on the quality and scope of the data.  Moreover, what these surveys merely sample 
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are views of political quality rather than an actual measure (Knack and Keefer 1995). There is 
room in the literature for such perceptional accounts. However, it is also good to use register 
data that do not rely on the quality of answers of people. This is an advantage of measuring 
democratic participation in the political institution of elections because it maps the shares of 
voters going to the polls and is relatively more direct of a measurement than the ones 
measured above. Furthermore, variables used for political institutions in economic geography 
needs to incorporate elections to it. The reason for this is that different dimensions of political 
institutions might have different impact on the innovative processes. For instance, while 
subsidies for developing or buying electric cars may have a targeted effect on this specific 
industry it may not affect the market for 3D printers. While corruption in customs and duties 
may have a strong effect on industries that rely on imports and exports relative to industries 
which do not. This thesis only examines the dimension of voting but is cognizant of the fact 
that this is only one dimension of political institutions. Kaasa (2009) shows that civic 
participation, a dimension of political institutions that has received very little attention in the 
literature had the strongest positive effect on innovative activity measured by patent 
applications and yet this dimension is rarely measured and tested in these studies. This is why 
in this study, voting turnout from each region will be considered as a measure of political 
institutions.  
5.2. An Overview of the Data and Variables 
 
This empirical analysis is based on micro-data from SCB specifically drawing from databases 
on firms and business as well as voting patterns from register data. Firms having from 10 to 
more than 250 employees in 2008 were included in the sampling frame. The sample in this 
data covers 619 firms which had R&D expenditures in 2009 belonging to the manufacturing 
sector. R&D in 2009 has been taken because I wanted to lag the effect of the signal from the 
elections to the following year since it is more realistic that firms can process that signal and 
allocate resources accordingly in the following year. An overview of the micro data is given in:  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs        Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
R&D Expenditures 654 35572.3 531436.2 0 1.22e+07
Firm Size 654 643.6453 1563.305 1 19025
Manufacturing 619  .6607431 .47384 0 1
Political Participation 654  .8195688 .0238261 .753 .895
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The dependent variable is R&D Expenditure, which is a continuous variable that measures the 
total research and development expenses the firm made in the following year of the election 
2009. I am taking the R&D of the firm in 2009 because I expect that the outcome of the signal 
is lagged in t+1. Besides evidence from expenditures on R&D, the data set provides information 
on the size, sector and regional location (see Table 1) of the firm. The SIZE of the firm refers to 
the number of employees in the beginning of 2008. SECTOR is a dummy variable with a value 
of 1 for manufacturing firms which dominates the sample.  
 
The regional institution used here is Political Participation. This is measured by voting shares 
of electoral turn out in general elections per region across Sweden in 2008. Table 2 shows that 
there is a total of 654 observations except for Manufacturing which is 619. The number of 
regions is mostly 49 (in the output) and there are on average 13 firms reporting R&D 
expenditures within each region. There are different sample standard deviations reported 
below, the overall standard deviation  
 
Table 2. Variability amongst the variables 
 
The location of firms was identified by using the unique organizational number of the 
headquarters (HQ) units of surveyed firms. For purposes of matching firms to specific regions, 
I only considered the HQ in the dataset which is reasonable because they are usually centers 
for planning and decision-making processes for R&D. The HQ of firms were matched to the 
specific region they belong to. Even if R&D activities are conducted in places other than the 
Variable Mean         Std. Dev.  Min Max     Observations
R&D Expenditures overall 35572.3            531436.2 0 1.22e+07      N =     654
between 14813.57        0 96302.66      n =      49
within 529748.4  -60730.36 1.21e+07  T-bar = 13.3469
           
Firm Size overall 643.6453         1563.305  1 19025  N =     654
between 390.4536        31 1898.833      n =      49
within 1538.983  -1238.188 18858.75  T-bar = 13.3469
           
Manufacturing overall .6607431             .47384 0 1   N =     619
between .1696881   .3934426 1 n =      48
within .424743  -.2483478 1.267301  T-bar = 12.8958
           
Political Participation overall .8195688          .0238261 .753 .895      N =     654
between .0193021       .753 .8461818      n =      49
within .0205771   .7541612 .9095802  T-bar = 13.3469
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headquarters of the firms, the decision to invest in R&D, ‘the innovation imperative’ as it were, 
is still one that is made in the headquarters where the leadership resides. If the argument is 
that the regional political environment affects this decision, then to attempt to capture this in 
other branches of the firm might double count this innovation proclivity which might lead to 
spurious results. Regional classification in this paper follows the Functional Analysis (FA) 
regional classification system. These current divisions, started from 2005, are based primarily 
on commuting statistics from 2003. This classification allows for consideration for factors such 
as trends in commuting and other things that can change travel patterns in a profound way. 
The number of FA regions is 72 designations (see figure 1 for a map of these regions). Apart 
from a general breakdown of the FA regions, certain regions have also been put into sub-
regions, because in some cases there are several functional parts such as labor markets within 
the same FA region. They need not be connected to the entire FA region, but only to a common 
central part of it. The division is mainly intended to be used in regional analysis. FA regions 
were formerly called local labor market regions (LA regions). The name change was made to 
reduce the risk of confusion with SCB's local labor markets (LA) (Statistics Sweden, 2011).’ 
Whilst any choice of regional classification will be somewhat contentious (Shearmur 2011) 
because of competing alternatives (such as NUTS or more traditionally geographical oriented 
systems), this thesis has chosen the FA region system because basing the classification on 
commuting trends can capture the economic activity of the innovation processes examined 
here as well as commuting belts link the political governance structures to each other. 
 
According to innovation approaches, as discussed in previous sections, investments in 
innovation can materialise where there are sufficient signals of stability so firms can 
appropriate critical resources such as knowledge, routines and agents to generate spillovers 
and interactions to generate innovation manifested in research and development costs 
amongst other things (Edquist 2005). This implies that we need to model the spatial conditions 
in which innovation processes take place. This essay has chosen regions as a potential site for 
innovation and political participation in terms of voting as a primary regional condition to test, 
motivated by the theoretical claims in the literature (see Section 2). 
 
If resources are to be shared, then the quality of political institutions in the region, which 
generally facilitates economic activities need to be measured and tested. The proxy variable 
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for political participation that will be used here is the percentage of those who voted in the 
general elections in the region in 2008 which captures the strength of democratic participation 
of the population which is a type of political institutions. 
 
Figure 1. Map of the FA Regions of Sweden 
 
Source: Statistics Sweden 2011 
To clearly designate which variables belong to which level, here is a description: 
 
Level 1 (Firm) 
 R&D Expenditures (R&D): the firm expenditure on research and development in 2009 
(in other words, returns on innovation) and is the response variable of the model. 
 Size (emp08): size of the firm measured by the number of employees in 2008. 
 Sector (Manufacturing = 1; Other = 0): dummy variable sector  
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Level 2 (Region) 
 Region (FA_HQ_Kommun): regional identifier 
 Political participation (Generalelection): proxy for political institutions, measured by 
the percentage of people who voted in the national elections in 2008. 
5.3. On the Multilevel Approach 
 
Since the data in this thesis involves two levels, where the firm is nested in the region, a 
multilevel econometric structure is appropriate to use. One of the contributions of this thesis 
is to quantitatively reflect this nested character of firms and their activities in the empirical 
strategy which is not usually done in previous studies. Multilevel structures are extensions of 
the ordinary least square (OLS) model but in a way it is more dynamic since the complexity of 
error terms are reflected. The data structures within these types of regressions are hierarchical 
which means that a level is embedded in another (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). 
Maximum Likelihood estimates (ML) are used to estimate multilevel models. ML estimation is 
a type of estimation which finds estimates of the parameters of the model  which most likely 
produce the outcomes for the variances and the co-variances (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 
2008). ML estimates perform an iterative process with starting values for the regression 
coefficients taken from the OLS regression estimates and with zeros for the variance 
components. In the first iteration, a procedure is used to try to improve on the starting values. 
The second iteration is performed after the likelihood function is examined. This process goes 
on until it converges. Although models do not necessarily converge. (Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal 2008). ML is the joint probability density of observed responses as it is related to the 
parameters of the model. A parameter estimate that maximise the ML function is what is being 
searched for in order to make responses look as ‘likely as possible’, hence the name. ML 
estimators exhibit ideal properties such as consistency which means that the estimates 
attained approaches the true values as the sample size increases and efficiency which means 
that the estimates attained are the smallest possible sampling variance in big samples (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal 2008).  
 
A multilevel theory must identify to which levels variables belong and which direct and 
interaction effects can be expected. For example, interaction effects between firms and the 
regional level require specification of processes within firms that cause those firms to be 
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influenced by certain aspects of the regional context. Therefore, multilevel issues must be 
explained with theories and empirics which reflects this hierarchy as such (Hox 2010). The 
multilevel regression model is also known as a random coefficient model or variance 
component model and it is a ‘hierarchical system of regression equations’. It uses a hierarchical 
data set. This means response variables are measured at the lowest level which in this case is 
the firm, and ‘the explanatory variables at all existing levels’ (Hox 2010). 
5.4. On the Multilevel Regression Procedure 
 
To further motivate the choice of the multilevel regression procedure, I first specify and fit an 
ordinary least square (OLS) regression model which is a commonly used model in the literature, 
to explore why an extension to the multilevel model is necessary if it is to capture the research 
questions at play in this thesis. I then specify three versions of the random intercept models: 
the null model without explanatory variables and the null model with explanatory variables 
from Level 1 and 2. In these models, the regression constants (intercepts) can vary among the 
Level 2 units (regions). I then add further complexity by running the random coefficient model, 
where the regression coefficients can show variation between contexts. In the final step, the 
models with explanatory variables at the regional level are fitted with interaction terms (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). So here is the standard specification of the OLS model: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽1 +  𝛽2𝑥2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑥3𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑥4𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗   
 
Where 𝒀𝒊𝒋 is the continuous variable R&D expenses, 𝒙𝟐𝒊𝒋 is Political Participation, 𝒙𝟑𝒊𝒋 is Size 
of the firm and 𝒙𝟒𝒊𝒋 is the categorical variable for Sector and 𝜖𝑖𝑗 is the error term. Fitting the 
OLS regression in Stata, I get the following results:  
Table 3. OLS Results 
 
 
R&D Expenditures Coef.          Std. Err.   t   P>t    [95% Conf. Interval]
Firm Size 203.8689                11.91931  17.10  0.000  180.4612 227.2766
Mean size in employment -159.5505 70.39687 -2.27 0.024 -297.7992 -21.30174
Manufacturing -5642.511  39754.51 -0.14 0.887 -83714.33 72429.3
Political Participation -135794.8 862861.5 -0.16 .875 -1830520 1558930
Mean Political Participation1043585 1778308 .59 .558 -2448742 4535911
Region -1678.282 1142.033 -1.47 .142 -3921.061 564.4963
_cons -702277.7 1269629 -.55 .580 -3195636 1791081
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This table includes mean centered (applied on Size and Political Participation) regression 
coefficients, their standard errors, the t-value, its probability level and the 95% confidence 
interval for the coefficients. Statistical significance of the regression coefficient is measured by 
checking the t-statistic which is normally distributed. The statistical hypothesis is: 
 
H0: 𝛽 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 H1: 𝛽 ≠ 0 
 
The test statistic is attained by dividing the estimated regression coefficient by its standard 
error. Both firm size and mean size in employment are statistically significant at the 1% level 
with the other coefficient being insignificant statistically. As can be seen from the table, for 
each additional employee, it can be expected that the firm’s R&D expenditure will increase. 
Since Manufacturing is a categorical explanatory variable, the regression coefficient is merely 
the difference in means between Manufacturing and Non-manufacturing sectors. The 
difference here is negative so firms from the Manufacturing sectors take in about 5642 units 
less in R&D expenditures than their non-Manufacturing counterparts which is unexpected 
given that manufacturing firms tend to have complicated production processes which might 
be susceptible to innovation but also, as said earlier this is not statistically significant. Whereas 
for political participation, for every unit increase of the population voting (stronger electoral 
turnout), the firm’s R&D expenditure decreases by 13794 units. This is counter to the 
theoretical argument I present above which is that if there is a signal for stability, the more 
investment in innovation a firm is supposed to make. This coefficient is not statistically 
significant. We cannot fully rely on this specification because this model effectively assumes a 
common residual error variance for both the firm and the region and there is no a priori 
argument why this should be the case. It is unrealistic to expect that firms and regions will 
have a common trajectory. It could be the case they have but this cannot be assumed. 
 
Graph 1 shows that there is some linearity in the data points in the sample and a linear 
regression is potentially useful but limited in studying the effects of regional conditions on the 
firm’s R&D expenditure because of the assumption of common variances of the error term for 
both levels the firm and the region.  
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This makes the OLS model unsuitable for this purpose. The empirical strategy, then, of the 
following discussions accounts for a region specific random intercept 𝜁1𝑗 and a region-specific 
random slope 𝜁2𝑗 in the multilevel models below. 
Means of the variables need to be taken in order to make them interpretable. And since the 
means of the variables have been used, then the regression constant will be the predicted 
mean for firms in averages of the explanatory variables. The variances of the intercept and the 
slope is interpretable as the expected variances for firm averages. Despite these mean 
transformations, the models are still equivalent to previous untransformed models because 
the standard deviations change alongside the variance components making the ‘ratio of 
variances to their standard errors generally the same’ (Hox 2010). From here, I proceed in 4 
steps in order to run the full econometric analysis of this study: 
 
 Step 1: Fit the Random Intercept Model: null model with the intercept only and the 
model with explanatory variables  
 Step 2: Develop the full Level 1 model 
 Step 3: Develop the random coefficient model 
 Step 4: Add Level 2 explanatory variables with Interaction terms 
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Step 1 is fitting the random intercept models: null model with the intercept only and the model 
with explanatory variables. The first one is specifying the null intercept-only model as 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽1 +  𝜁1𝑗 +  𝜖𝑖𝑗   
 
Let 𝑌𝑖𝑗 be the R&D Expenditures for firm i in region j. The regression coefficient is assumed to 
be constant and equal to the total mean. Since I cannot assume that firms situated in the same 
region are independent or that the residuals 𝜖𝑖𝑗  and 𝜖𝑖′𝑗 are independent, I split the residuals 
into two error components, 𝜁1𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 . So 𝜁1𝑗 is the Level 2 residual, which represent the 
deviations of the regional mean from the overall mean. The residual of the model is partitioned 
into two components representing the variation at the two levels or between 𝜁1𝑗 and within 
regions 𝜖𝑖𝑗 (Level 2 unit) variation.   
Table 4. Maximum likelihood estimates for R&D expenditures (Results from the Random 
Intercept). 
 
 
This table consists of the results from the fixed and random part. Here sd(_cons) is the estimate 
of the random-intercept results is at 269.6285 which means that regions vary in their 
intercepts with this estimated standard deviation. And the sd(Residual) is the estimate of the 
within region residual standard deviation which is at 531029.7. Since this random intercept 
model induces correlations among responses for units in the same region, known as the intra-
class correlation, I compute it below. The proportion of the variance in 𝑌𝑖𝑗 captured from the 
variance between the Level 2 units is defined as and results in  
 
  ?̂?  =  
𝜎𝜁
2
𝜎𝜁
2+𝜎𝜖
2̂
 = 2,81993E+11 
   
Est (SE)
Fixed part
Beta 35571.43 20765.16
Random Part
xtmixed
sd(_cons) 269.6285 1006.04
sd(Residual) 531029.7 14683.09
Log likelihood -9549.3888
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This is the intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC). The ICC can be considered as a baseline for 
estimating the variances of the two levels. I now extend the random intercept model by adding 
the explanatory variables in Level 1 which are fixed parameters, inputting it so Model 2 is 
generated. Specifying the model: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽3𝑥3𝑖𝑗 +  𝜁1𝑗 +  𝜖𝑖𝑗    
       =  (𝛽1 +  𝜁1𝑗) + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽3𝑥3𝑖𝑗 +  𝜖𝑖𝑗    
 
And in variable notation, this is the model:  
 
𝑅 & 𝐷 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗 =  (𝛽1 +  𝜁1𝑗) + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸2𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽3𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅3𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗    
The explanatory variables are 𝑥2𝑖𝑗 and 𝑥3𝑖𝑗 where 𝜁1𝑗 and 𝜖𝑖𝑗 are error components. 𝜁1𝑗 is the 
error component for companies in the same region which engenders dependence within the 
regions. This departs from the OLS method because it accounts for the spatial dimension. I let 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = (𝑥2𝑖𝑗 , … , 𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗)′ be the vector composed of the predictors with exogenous assumptions 
being:  
𝐸(𝜁1𝑗|𝑋𝑖𝑗) = 0 
𝐸(𝜖𝑖𝑗|𝑋𝑖𝑗 , 𝜁1𝑗) = 0 
 
It follows that 𝐸(𝜖𝑖𝑗|𝑋𝑖𝑗) = 0. It follows that both 𝜁1𝑗 and 𝜖𝑖𝑗 are uncorrelated with predictors. 
The distributional assumption for the model is  
𝜁1𝑗|𝑋𝑖𝑗 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜓) 
𝜖𝑖𝑗   |𝑋𝑖𝑗 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜃) 
 
Here it follows that 𝜁1𝑗 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜓) and𝜖𝑖𝑗 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜃), having a normal distribution, respectively. 
This model evaluates the effects of both firm-level explanatory variable: SIZE and SECTOR. The 
estimated regression coefficients are given in Table 5. The coefficient for size shows a positive 
number which means that SIZE has a positive effect which is statistically significant at the 1% 
level on the firms R&D expenditures, of those from the same region, controlling for the other 
covariates. This suggests that size is an important factor for the increase in the research and 
development investment of the firm. 
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Table 5. Results from Step 1 and 2. 
 
 
 
The t-statistic is used to test the null hypothesis in the OLS models but in multilevel models, 
the Wald Statistic with asymptotic chi-square null distributions, with the number of 
restrictions imposed by the null hypothesis as degrees of freedom or likelihood ratios.  
Consider the null hypothesis that both the regression coefficients for 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸2𝑖𝑗 and 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅3𝑖𝑗 
are both zero or in other words, that both size and sector have no effect on the firms from 
specific regions as opposed to the alternative that at least one of the parameters are nonzero. 
 
H0: 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 0  
 
I tested whether this null hypothesis of the two estimated covariates are zero and a chi-square 
Wald statistic of 294.26 at 2 degrees of freedom, is returned with a P-value of 0.000 so the null 
hypothesis is clearly rejected at 1% level which means that the explanatory variables is not 
zero which makes them usable in the model.  
 
The standard deviation of the estimated random intercepts are given in Table 5 which can be 
found in the ‘Random part’ of the table. The residuals standard deviation estimate of Level 1 
is 449172.3. The estimate of the random intercept standard deviation is .0016838. In the fixed 
part of the table, one can see the estimated regression coefficients. In random part of the table, 
one can see the estimated standard deviations for the random intercept and Level 1 residuals. 
 
Est (SE) Est (SE) Est (SE)
Fixed Part
B1(_cons) -86129.7 31501.55 35571.43 20765.16 543469.9 716757.5
B2 (size) 199.6267*** 11.64808
B3 (sector) -5385.487 38227.59
B4 (Political 
participation) 4356.279 746102.4 -621951.6 874317.2
Random Part
sd(_cons) .0016838 269.6285 12562.82
sd(Residual) 449172.3 5311029.7 530692.3
Full Model Null Model Level 2 covariate
Note: ***is for statistical signif icance for the 1% level, ** for 5% level and * for 10% level
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Step 2: Develop the Random intercept model with all the explanatory variables 
 
Wherein the random intercept model which includes all the predictors from both levels is 
specified: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽3𝑥3𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽4𝑥4𝑖𝑗 +  𝜁1𝑗 +  𝜖𝑖𝑗    
       =  (𝛽1 +  𝜁1𝑗) + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽3𝑥3𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑥4𝑖𝑗 +  𝜖𝑖𝑗    
=  (𝛽1 +  𝜁1𝑗) + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅3𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛4𝑖𝑗 +  𝜖𝑖𝑗    
 
Assumptions from the previous model apply but with the difference that we are now adding 
the Level 2 predictor variable Political participation in the model . The SIZE and SECTOR 
estimates remain relatively the same as with the previous model. Political participation seems 
to have a positive effect on firm’s R&D Expenditures which is statistically significant. For every 
percentage increase in the population voting in regions, there is a corresponding 4356.279 
increase in the firm R&D expenditures. The estimates are not statistically significant however. 
 
Step 3 wherein the Random coefficient model is specified. This means that the mean intercept 
and slope are estimated along with the co-variability of the intercepts and slopes in regions. 
R&D expenditures and its relationship with political participation is modelled in line with the 
previous random intercept model including random intercept 𝜁1𝑗 of regions but extending it 
to include the region-specific random slope 𝜁2𝑗 for Political Participation 𝑥4𝑖𝑗:  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽1 +  𝛽2𝑥2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑥3𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑥4𝑖𝑗 + 𝜁1𝑗 + 𝜁2𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 +  𝜖𝑖𝑗    
       =  (𝛽1 +  𝜁1𝑗) + +𝛽2𝑥2𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽3𝑥3𝑖𝑗 +  (𝛽4 +  𝜁2𝑗)𝑥4𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗    
 
wherein the predictor 𝑥𝑖𝑗  is exogenous where the 𝛦(𝜁1𝑗|𝑥𝑖𝑗) =  0 ,  𝛦(𝜁2𝑗|𝑥𝑖𝑗) =
 0, 𝛦(𝜖𝑖𝑗|𝑥𝑖𝑗 , 𝜁1𝑗 , 𝜁2𝑗) =  0. Then 𝜁1𝑗  represents region j’s intercept and how it deviates from 
the mean intercept 𝛽1 and 𝜁2𝑗 manifesting the deviation of region j’s Political Participation 
slope from 𝛽4, the mean slope. All random terms are uncorrelated with 𝑥𝑖𝑗 and error term 
𝜖𝑖𝑗   are independent regardless of which level, of the regions and or the firms.  
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These are the estimates -89713.99 and 199.6294 for the population mean intercept and slope. 
Notice the similarity for the estimates from the previous models, especially Model 1 and 2. 
The estimated random intercept standard deviation and Level 1 residual standard deviation is 
much higher than for the random-intercept model. This is due to apparently a worse fit of the 
for the random coefficient model with the regression lines. Interpretations of the relationship 
of the covariates with the dependent variable of R&D expenditures are still very similar up to 
this point to previous models which is that size of the company in terms of the number of its 
employees tends to drive the increases in investments in R&D expenditures rather than 
political participation which is the main hypothesis of the thesis. Perhaps the reason why this 
is the case is because the signals are so entrenched within the economic system that the 
expectations for a stable and peaceful transition of power within the political sphere no longer 
directly affects the firm decision in terms of commitment to future output, particularly in 
research and development costs.  
Table 6. Results from Step 3 and 4. 
 
 
Step 4: Random coefficient model with Interaction terms is specified as the following:  
𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽1 +  𝛽2𝑥2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑥3𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑥4𝑖𝑗 + 𝜁1𝑗 + 𝜁2𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 +  𝜖𝑖𝑗    
       =  (𝛽1 +  𝜁1𝑗) + (𝛽2 +  𝜁2𝑗)𝑥2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑥3𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽4𝑥4𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽5𝑥5𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽6𝑥6𝑖𝑗  𝜖𝑖𝑗   
Parameter Est (SE) Est (SE) Est (SE)
Fixed Part   
B1 (_cons) -86129.7 31501.55 -89713.99 614762.3 -261432.9 1124194
B2 (size) 199.6267*** 11.64808 199.6294*** 11.6577 -340.3577
B3 (sector) -5385.487 38227.59 -5365.033 38387.77 617697 1348189
B4 (political 
participation) 4356.279 746102.4 4356.3 746102.4 209171.4 1366385
B5(size*political 
participation) 665.4115 565.719
B6 
(sector*political -758698.3 1641152
Random Part
sd(_cons) .0016838 322.0586 233.3209
sd(political 
participation) 388.5869 281.3933
sd(Residual 449172.3 449172.3 448637.3
Log Likelihood -8934.7082
Note: ***is for statistical signif icance for the 1% level, ** for 5% level and * for 10% level
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Random intercept model
Rand. Coefficient with 
interaction termsRandom coefficient
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These are the estimates -261432.9 and -340.3577 for the population-mean intercept and slope. 
They are very dissimilar to previous models. Size, for example, now has a negative effect on 
research and development expenditures. The model does not seem to react well when 
interaction terms are added to the model. The reason may be that there is no inherent 
relationship with between the selected interacted variables. One way to interpret the standard 
deviations estimated from the random intercept and random slope is to construct intervals 
where 95% of the region's random intercepts and slopes are expected to lie. For the intercepts 
-261432.9 plus or minus 1.96 multiplied by 233.3209 which means that 95% of regions have 
their intercept in the range of -60998216.83 to -60997302.21. So the regional mean of the 
R&D Expenditures for firms from regions with low political participation vary between these 
intervals. For slopes we obtain -340.3577 + and – 1.96*(281.3933) giving an interval from -
95222.85 to -96325.91. This means that 95% of regions have political participation slopes 
between -95222.85 to -96325.91. It is useful to form intervals for slopes in order to know the 
probability that slopes will likely have different signs across varied regions. The range from -
95222.85 to -96325.91 is not very wide so it seems that regional political participation 
generally has the same effect on the regions.  
 
So in terms of the hypothesis set out for testing in this thesis, H1 which is that the quality of 
the political institutional environment in the region as measured in voting share positively 
affects the R&D Expenditures, this was not established because findings were not statistically 
significant. As for H2 which is that the effect of regional political institutions on the firm is 
mediated by the size of the firm was also not established because the interaction terms was 
not statistically significant. What I did find was that size of the firm in terms of the number of 
employees drives increases in research and development expenditures. As for H3 which is that 
the effect of regional political institutions is mediated by the sector the firm belongs to, this 
was also not established because the interaction term estimates meant to capture this in the 
relationship were not statistically significant. 
 
6. Scope and Limitations 
 
This thesis has several limitations and by way of expounding on this, the scope of thesis is 
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demarcated. These are discussed in the following paragraphs. When identifying firms in the 
data, only the HQ were matched to the regions in the data, completely ignoring subsidiary 
firms. This limits the scope of the thesis because subsidiaries could potentially be a rich source 
of information, particularly if the HQ designates their research activities to their subsidiaries. 
Due to time constraints and difficulties in matching the subsidiaries to regions, this is not 
covered in the analysis in this thesis. However, for the most part, it is reasonable to believe 
that decisions regarding research and development are taken at the management level which 
is usually at the headquarters so the scope of the thesis remains reasonable for its aims. 
 
An aspect of institutions which is not covered in this thesis is the notion of path dependency 
or what is believed to be a feedback loop between regions and institutions. Paths are 
determined by previous trajectories and constructions of institutions so whilst political 
participation in this period might have an effect on firm output, it is not out of the question 
that the effect is an outcome from a political signal from another electoral period. Institutions 
change and are dynamic albeit incrementally at times and these changes can be difficult to 
observe. These institutional changes are not covered in this thesis. Furthermore, the reasons 
why institutions do and do not change are also not covered such as the purposive action of 
actors when they mobilise resources to try to embed their goals and interest within emergent 
institutions. Firms and other actors are not passive players in the institutional game. They are 
aware that the framework institutional conditions can have serious consequences and effects 
over their activities and thus, they try to influence the direction and design of institutional 
dynamics. Although this was not covered in this thesis, it is in line with the idea of power and 
the political dimension of the interdependence of firm activities and political institutions. But 
since there are so many types of political institutions and some are easier to measure than 
others, this thesis has limited itself in only studying voting shares across regions which at least 
captures the quality of political participation. And whilst the quality of political participation 
may have some change effects on the current state of institutions, it is outside the scope of 
the data and this study. Also, firms may be affecting regional rates of political participation 
through lobbying, marketing or other types of activities which raises the issue of reverse 
causality which is not covered or addressed at all in this thesis. It is possible that the reason 
why there is strong political participation is because of high R&D expenditure of the firm but 
this doesn’t seem likely or at the very least, not self-evident why this would be the case. But 
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still, the effect of the firm on the region is not explored. 
 
Regional studies tend to raise questions on the choice of what constitutes a region. This thesis 
acknowledges that boundaries can be fuzzy and that a choice of region can be contentious 
since there are alternative formulations of region. But it is also important to select and test an 
existing conception of a region which is what this thesis has attempted to do by using the FA 
region classification. Testing on other classifications such as the NUTS region, a classification 
used at the EU level as well as standard geographical classifications could provide an 
interesting comparison with this study as well as other existing ones that use the FA region 
classification. 
 
Because of the sheer demands of the multilevel method on the data and the risks of models 
not converging (which happened in this study when I tried to include the interaction terms 
between the sector and political participation, the model refused to converge), numerous 
potential variables were excluded from this study. Also the fact that most of the variables used 
proved to be statistically insignificant, this type of analysis might benefit from a more robust 
specification. Furthermore, taking proxy variables of regional conditions were limited because 
there it is difficult to quantify abstract qualities of the region and even when a proxy variable 
becomes available, it is still an indirect measurement and could potentially be subject to 
misspecification. There seems to be very little variation across Swedish regions in the political 
dimension at least in terms of voting. Whilst it may been interesting to find variation, the fact 
the firms themselves are heterogeneous did allow this thesis to explore the differences in the 
way firms respond to general regional framework conditions. 
 
This study primarily drew from the economic geography and new institutional literature as 
well as regional and innovation studies. Institutional studies have found their way across the 
breadth of the social sciences but this thesis has chosen to draw only from the previously 
stated literature even though it probably could have benefited from incorporating work and 
ideas from the other social science disciplines that are currently working on institutions. What 
economic geography does have and other disciplines do not is the explicit argument for a 
spatial dimension of institutions, a framework which this thesis relied on extensively. 
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A significant limitation of the empirical approach taken in this essay is the use of ‘voter turnout’ 
as a proxy variable for political participation. Voting, as a political participation, constitute a 
very limited aspect of the civic and indeed even electoral activity spectrum individuals can 
engage in. Citizens have at their disposal different forums and mechanism to express their 
citizenship such as protesting, attending town hall meetings, circulating and signing petitions, 
campaigning, etc. These could all be important signals towards the vibrancy or the strength of 
the political environment. These examples of political participation beyond voting is not tested 
quantitatively here because of a lack of data or time to collect this data would not be ideal and 
is therefore beyond the scope of this thesis. Still, having acknowledged that, elections are an 
interesting point of interaction to study because it happens rather consistently every four years 
in Sweden at both the national and regional level, with voting as a ubiquitous and common 
form of political participation and therefore is a good point for testing political participation. 
 
Another limitation are the lags employed in the empirical strategy for when a firm receives the 
signal from the voting turnout of an election. In this thesis, I lagged this signaling mechanism 
one year in terms of the dependent variable R&D expenditures of the firm but there is no 
guarantee how much and long a signal is internalized by the firm. Also, some signals fade or 
get stronger in the second or third period so it might have been interesting to explore the 
effects in different time periods but it was not the scope of this thesis. 
 
7. Policy Implications 
 
Geography, firm activities and the political institutional context matters are interdependent 
and thus are important subjects for a more comprehensive research agenda. Although this 
thesis and the models used in it proved to have little explanatory power, empirical evidence 
from the literature does suggest this interdependence have profound implications for policy. 
Often, policymakers treat firms and economic policy as isolated from the spatial context in 
which firms are embedded in. Given some of the findings of this paper, it seems that a 
comprehensive policy should account for the institutional conditions of the region since it can 
have important implications on firm activities and output. Some of the implications of the 
study address some of the questions regarding regional innovation policy, particularly those 
  
48 
 
relating to the construction of regional advantage. If low performing regions are to undergo 
transformations and renewal, attract qualified human capital and spur innovation clusters that 
attract firms to locate in these regions, then it seems that it is not only the economic 
infrastructure that needs to be secured but also the institutional framework, in this case, the 
political framework of elections and voting. This directly relates to Swedish policy towards 
regional renewal where some industries, like ones in communications and technology, are 
reaching its end and clustered regions are weakening. Strategies for renewal need to strongly 
account for the institutional context. If institutions matter as framework conditions for firm 
activities which is the bases for economic development,  then taking on this institutional 
framework in economic geography might help address issues involving the unequal 
development across regions, with some more prosperous than others.  
 
Extrapolating on a wider scale, this thesis has potential policy implications relating to EU policy 
as well with its increasing trend giving funding and support to different local regions across 
Europe. The EU should include institutional quality at the regional level when investing in 
innovation.  Relative to Japan and the US, the EU has a poor record of converting scientific and 
technological know-how into commercially viable products and services, the inability to 
transfer knowledge from laboratory to industry and from firm to firm is well documented 
(Morgan 2007).  Government investment in the democratic process as it relates to civic 
mindedness can impact this investment in research and development. Furthermore, the EU 
lacks a robust networking culture and the disposition to collaborate for mutual ends. When 
creating policy to stimulate this, one must keep in mind that redirecting policy at the regional 
level is an important dimension to address. Stimulating the institutional framework in a region 
is not just a welfare issue but an economic development one as well to the extent that it helps 
firms mediate uncertainty in future production and innovation. Another issue of the EU is that 
it sometimes directs its policies at solving symptoms of problems such as unemployment but 
often underestimates finding the solutions to underlying causes that give rise to the symptoms 
in the first place (Morgan 2007). Focusing on institutions and even institutional change, could 
help it addressing systemic and structural problems since institutions tend to underpin 
economic activities. 
 
This highlights the special role that regional governing bodies’ play in economic development 
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and in generating interest and commitment to innovation. With the previously stated trend of 
the increasing power and control that national governing bodies have been giving to regions 
across Sweden, it become all the more important to examine the structural conditions at play 
in regions. Context seem to matter much when applying development policies and one size 
fits all regional policies have been shown to be quite ineffective(Tödtling and Trippl 2005). 
There are specific challenges however, because of the special governing structure of Sweden, 
there are ambiguities and overlaps in the governance duties of municipalities and regions. 
There seems to be power struggles within it with usually the municipality having the upper 
hand as they have more resources such as amenities and financing and revenues from taxes 
(they manage all the land) and thus, have the funding and power to implement policies as they 
see fit, even if it is at the expense of developing better network links in the whole region rather 
than just in the municipality. This thesis suggests a more strengthened regional approach to 
policy making. If regions are important sites of firm activities and investments in innovation, 
more resources and policy power should be allocated to them in order to enhance the 
performance of firms in terms of growth and innovation output and economic development 
in general. 
 
Furthermore, this thesis has implications on how regional innovation policy should be 
constructed. There needs to be a better accounting for the regional institutions at play which 
frame the innovative activities of the firm (Tödtling and Trippl 2005, Isaksen and Trippl 2014). 
Institutions can have a wide ranging impact on the effectivity and efficacy of any innovation 
policy particularly if it does not consider the unique framework conditions which is situated in 
the regional context. Framework conditions enable and constrain firm behavior and output 
and as such, must be taken into consideration in the design of any policy.  
 
While effort of research environments such as The Quality of Government Institute in 
Gothenburg University represents progress in terms of access to repositories of data on 
institutions, it still remains limited because it is reliant on survey data. Therefore, one of the 
policy implications of this thesis is one that concerns data collection. The SCB should invest in 
collecting and constructing an institutional index given the potentially high quality of Swedish 
data. There should also be scope to expand innovation scoreboards to include more 
institutional indicators as the empirical evidence on whether institutions matter to innovation 
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performance is growing.  
8. Conclusions 
 
This paper tested whether geography, regions and the institutional framework conditions that 
underpin the activities of firms matter can confirm earlier findings in the literature (Srholec 
2010). In a very limited way, the thesis was able to do this by looking at the size of firms in 
terms of number of employees, coming out statistically significant the positive way it affects 
R&D expenditures with differences in regional conditions accounted for. The effects of regional 
conditions may be mediated by the firm characteristics such as size of the firm and to which 
industry it belongs to but this thesis was not able to establish this because of statistical 
insignificance of the interaction terms. As far as methodologies go, multilevel techniques offer 
a quantitative method that upholds the internal logic of the economic geography framework 
because it can incorporate the spatial dimension rather than assuming it away as in a more 
commonly used regression techniques. This is an improvement over standard linear regression 
techniques but as can be seen in the aforementioned non-convergence of some models in this 
thesis, this technique is very demanding on the data available. As political participation is not 
a one dimensional variable but can be captured in different dimensions, there is a need to 
further test these other dimensions on the innovation processes to really capture it effect. This 
thesis only tested political participation in terms of voting turnout and the signaling 
mechanism it provides to firms in mediating future uncertainty, deciding on their output in the 
future and committing their production schedules and resources towards research and 
development towards innovation. 
 
The two main arguments from this thesis is that firstly, firms use the regional institutional 
quality as a signal for their investment schedule and secondly that, firms need to assess the 
regional institutional quality of civic mindedness in the community in order to realise whether 
there exists the ability to overcome collective action problems of cooperation, coordination 
and sharing of tacit knowledge which then become useful for investing in innovation. 
Throughout the thesis, the second argument seemed to be more applicable to the Swedish 
case than the first one which, on reflection, is one of the biggest lessons this author picked up 
on. That no matter how well established an argument like ‘the signaling mechanisms’ 
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argument is and how logical it is, one still needs to consider whether it actually applies to the 
context in which that argument is being tested on. It may be that one of the reasons the 
empirical tests did not work is because the argument is not applicable to the Swedish context. 
Still, the hunch was reasonable and it was well worth testing, if only to reject a well-founded 
hypothesis. 
 
One of the findings of this thesis is the positive and significant effect of size of the firm in terms 
of the number of employees firms in most of the models used to test this relationship, as 
mentioned earlier. So the bigger the firms are, the more it invests in research and development 
programs. This is interesting because it adds to the notion that human capital in organizations 
can drive activities towards research, development and innovation. This has some policy 
implications. If institutions matter in firm activities, particularly those geared towards research 
and development and in general the innovation output of firms, firm should encourage growth 
in terms of hiring more employees and focus on developing the human capital of firms. Policy 
makers should also take into consideration that economic activities should not be abstracted 
out of the social, cultural and political context they are situated in because even though this 
thesis was not able to establish this directly, the empirical evidence in the literature suggests 
that framework conditions of the region are an important consideration for planning, initiating 
and implementing any policy geared towards improving economies and firm activities that are 
spatially bounded. Innovation is a complex activity and it is one that cannot be divorced from 
the context it is situated in.  
 
This thesis mainly contributed, albeit in a limited way, to the body of empirical evidence to 
support the notion that firm embeddedness in a regional setting constitutes critical influences 
towards firm output such as innovation in terms of research and development. Further 
exploration into this area should focus on empirically testing the causal relationship between 
political as well as other types of institutions and innovation expenditures and output to the 
firm. Causality is difficult to establish but new methodologies are emerging to handle this 
increase in explanatory complexity such as natural experiment techniques. Economic 
geography and innovation studies would benefit from incorporating such advance techniques 
to strengthen the theoretical foundations of this supposed causal relationship. 
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Institutions, whether political, social or cultural, are not static even when they seem durable 
and inert. Institutions change in the long run and sometimes in the short run as well. Future 
research agendas should focus on studying institutional change and the mechanisms by which 
they change as it interacts with firm activities. It is also entirely possible that the past 
investments of firms on innovation can be the reason why some institutions change or need 
to change. Disruptive technologies can have this effect on the market and in society such as 
the internet for example. This suggest that there is a feedback process between firm activities 
and institutional change which might prove to be an important area of research. Institutions 
also don’t change on their own. There are significant resources mobilized in order to influence 
the direction of change so that they can reflect firm interests more. This is manifested in 
lobbying, campaigning and funding contributions to the political sphere. This dimension of 
power and vested interests in the transformation of institutions and the way it can enable or 
constrain firm activities should also find a place in the future research agenda on this topic. If 
the grand challenges of this century will find solutions from academic research, then this 
research agenda must extend towards understanding the inherent complexities of the effects 
of institutions on economic development, not least of political institutions which are spatially 
constructed.  
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